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The Honorable Sven Erik Holmes*
I would like to welcome you this morning and to congratulate the
University of Tulsa for its continued sponsorship of this symposium.
This marks the seventh year in which the College of Law has presented
this important event.
The 2000 Term of the United States Supreme Court will forever be
remembered as the Term in which the Supreme Court again entered the
field of politics by declaring the winner of the Presidential election
between Governor George W Bush and Vice-President Al Gore.
We could, of course, spend this entire symposium analyzing Bush v.
Gore.' I will leave it to others, however, to address whether there was
standing to assert a claim under the United States Constitution; whether
the facts presented a political question; whether there was an equal
protection violation; whether the case was npe for adjudication; or
whether federalism, as the Rehnquist Court has defined it, required that
the Supreme Court respect the construction of state law by the Flonda
Supreme Court.
Instead, I will confine my comment here to the observation that
history will be the judge of whether the most fundamental responsibility
of the Supreme Court-to promote confidence in the rule of law-was
helped or harmed by this decision.
I.
During the 2000 Term, the United States Supreme Court decided
79 cases, compared to 73 last year and 75 the year before.2 In the
United States District Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. Marcia Coyle, An Activist Court Rules on Speech, Immigration anld One Bg Election, 23
Natil. L.J. C1 (Aug. 26, 2001).
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1990's, the average number of opinions per term was just over 80
cases.3 This compares to the decade of the 1980's, when the average
number of opinions per term was nearly twice that number.4
Some have argued that there are splits in the circuits, or other
areas of statutory or constitutional construction, that have been left
unattended as a result of the Court's reduced docket. In my judgment,
there is simply no evidence that any such cases have been ignored. The
reduced caseload does not appear to have affected in any way the
capacity of the Court to decide those issues which are both significant
and pressing.
This Term, more than ever before, the Court decided cases by a 5-4
margin. Of the 79 opinions, 26 were by a 5-4 vote--compared to 20
such splits during the 1999 Term.6 Moreover, the language in the
opinions suggests that the sharp division on the Court will continue well
into the future.
Consider for example, the following exchange in Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett7
For the five justice majority: "[allthough Justice Breyer would infer
from Congress' general conclusions regarding societal discrimination
against the disabled that the States had likewise participated in such
action .... the House and Senate committee reports on the ADA flatly
contradict this assertion. " 8
And for Justice Breyer in dissent: "[tihe Court, through its
evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its failure to
distinguish between judicial and legislative constitutional competencies,
improperly invades a power that the Constitution assigns to Congress."9
One consequence of so many 5-4 decisions is that a single justice
can wield considerable power. That power is now incontrovertibly held
by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. In fact, at times, this Court has been
described as the O'Connor Court. This Term, Justice O'Connor was in
the majority 72 times.10 More importantly, she was in the majority in 20
of the Court's 26 opinions decided by a 5-4 vote." By comparison, in
the 1999 Term, of the 73 cases decided, Justice O'Connor was in the





7. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
8. Id, at 966.
9. Id at 975-76.
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The cases decided this Term reflect two distinct trends that merit
attention.
A.
First, the Rehnquist Court's signature jurisprudence has now
evolved into its second generation. For the last six years, the Supreme
Court has engaged in a systematic effort to implement Chief Justice
Rehnquist's vision of the role of the United States Congress and the role
of the states in our federal system. These cases form the legacy of the
Rehnquist Court. Relying upon an expressed view of the intent of the
framers, the Court declared new principles of constitutional law. As a
result, the power of Congress to legislate under both the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment has been severely
restricted. 3
This Term, the Court relied, not on the framers, but on its own
opinions. The cases of City of Boerne v. Flores, 14 Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents,15 and United States v. Lopez, 16 in particular, were cited as
controlling authority. In dealing with issues of federalism and
Congressional power, the Court now emphasizes the importance of
following "firmly established precedent"-recognizing that such
precedents were only recently " firmly established."17 I observe, without
comment, that the same fidelity to stare decisis has not yet found its
way into the Court's opinions involving Roe v. Wade. 18
B.
Second, again this Term the Court will be accused of judicial
activism because certain opinions appear to advance a political
philosophy. These opinions are separate and apart from Bush v. Gore,
which was inherently political because it decided a presidential election
and was limited to the facts of the case.
In prior years, the Supreme Court exercised judicial activism
through a narrow interpretation of the constitutional limits on the power
of Congress to legislate. This Term, the Court expanded its activist
approach to strict interpretations of federal statutes and legislative
history.
Specifically, in Garrett and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
13. See e.g. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
14. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
15. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. See e.g. Garrett 121 S. Ct at 962 (citing Kim1d, 528 U.S. 62).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing the fundamental right of privacy).
20011
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County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,'9 the Court declared its
own view of the legislative history to reach a result. In Garrett, the Court
rejected a determination by Congress that the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") was necessary to address prior acts of
discrimination by the states.20 More importantly, the Court opined that
the judiciary's assessment of the facts, not the assessment of the
legislature, should control any determination of whether legislation is
proper under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 ' Accordingly, the Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment's grant of immunity to the states barred
state employees from suing their employer for ADA violations.
In Solid Waste Agency, the Court held that provisions of the Clean
Water Act should be narrowly interpreted-notwithstanding a broad
interpretation of the Act previously expressed by Congress.23 The Court
justified imposing its own view of the law as necessary to avoid ruling on
whether the statute violated the Commerce Clause under Lopez.24 The
Court had followed a similar approach the previous Term in Jones v.
United States.25  The effect was for the Court to posit a possible
constitutional problem as the basis for rejecting Congress' interpretation
26
of the law and to substitute its own. Of course, if Congress exceeded
its authority under the Commerce Clause by enacting the Clean Water
Act, the statute should be overturned. However, to modify the provisions
of the law to avoid reaching a theoretical constitutional issue is in effect
to displace the view of Congress with the view of the five-justice majority.
The case legitimizes the argument that, notwithstanding a contrary
interpretation by the legislative branch, many federal statutes may be
construed ab initio by the judicial branch in order to insure that they do
not run afoul of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Over the years, the Rehnquist Court has been criticized for judicial
activism. The 2000 Term will exacerbate this concern. Our system was
founded on the principle that courts are responsible for interpreting the
law and not making the law. Restraint requires that the judicial branch
show great deference to the acts of the legislative branch. Courts, which
fail to exercise judicial restraint in effect, are substituting the views of
the appointed judiciary for the views of elected officials.27  In recent
19. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
20. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964-65.
21. Id. at 963.
22. Id. at 967-68.
23. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 167-68.
24. Id. at 173-74.
25. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
26. Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 174-75; Jones, 529 U.S. at 857-58.
27. Judge Learned Hand once wrote: "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by
a bevy of Platonic Guardians [i.e. Judges].... If they were in charge, I should miss the
stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction
of public affairs. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 75 (Harv. U. Press 1958).
[Vol. 37:1
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years, despite mounting criticism, the Rehnquist Court appears to have
actually increased its level of judicial activism.
III.
It has been said that the closeness of the 2000 Presidential election
demonstrated to the American people that every individual vote counts.
I would add that the judicial activism of the Supreme Court in recent
years similarly demonstrates that every individual vote counts.
Presidential elections are about very important issues-among the most
important of which is the future make-up of the Supreme Court. When
the Supreme Court engages in judicial activism to implement a
philosophical point of view, it is clear that any presidential election will
have political repercussions for many years to come.
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